Consular discretion and work visas: Italian Administrative Court limits arbitrary refusals
By Fabio Loscerbo (Lawyer based in Bologna, Italy)
This article is part of a series by Fabio Loscerbo examining national administrative practices, domestic judicial review, and their broader implications for European and international migration governance.
A recent judgment delivered by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio (TAR Lazio, Section V Quater, judgment published on 1 April 2026, general register number 2871 of 2024) offers an important clarification on the limits of consular discretion in the context of work visa procedures.
The case concerned the refusal of a visa for subordinate employment issued by the Italian Embassy in Islamabad. The applicant, a Pakistani national, had obtained a prior work authorization (nulla osta) from the competent Italian authorities but was subsequently denied entry on the basis that he did not hold a driving licence.
This reasoning was found by the Court to be inadequate.
From a legal perspective, the judgment highlights a structural issue in migration governance: the relationship between domestic administrative procedures and consular decision-making abroad.
In the Italian system, the issuance of a work visa follows a two-step process. First, the competent immigration office (Sportello Unico per l’Immigrazione) assesses the application and grants a work authorization. Only at a later stage does the consular authority issue the visa, which should normally be consistent with the prior administrative determination.
In this case, the Court emphasized that the consular authority cannot disregard the outcome of the domestic procedure without conducting an adequate and independent assessment.
The refusal was based on the assumption that a driving licence was required for the position of manual worker in the construction sector. However, the Court found that this requirement had not been properly established and, more importantly, had not been assessed during the initial administrative phase leading to the issuance of the work authorization.
The judgment underlines that such a deficiency amounts to a clear failure of investigation and reasoning.
The Court further observed that the authority competent to assess the professional requirements of the job position is, in principle, the immigration office that issued the work authorization. In this case, that office had not raised any concerns and had not revoked the authorization, nor had it requested additional checks from the labour inspectorate.
This element is decisive: once the administrative procedure has been completed positively, the consular authority cannot introduce new requirements based on incomplete or unsupported assumptions.
The reasoning of the judgment is particularly significant in that it explicitly characterizes the refusal as “apodictic”, meaning that it lacks a proper logical and evidentiary foundation.
Such a characterization is not merely formal. It reflects a broader judicial concern regarding the risk of arbitrary decision-making in visa procedures, especially when decisions are based on generic or unverified criteria.
As a consequence, the Court annulled the refusal and clarified that, in the subsequent re-examination of the case, the diplomatic authority cannot rely on the same insufficient evidentiary basis.
This statement introduces a form of “constraining effect” on the administration, limiting the possibility of reiterating the same reasoning without addressing the deficiencies identified by the Court.
From a broader perspective, this decision contributes to redefining the scope of consular discretion. While consular authorities undoubtedly retain a margin of evaluation in visa procedures, this discretion is not absolute and must operate within the framework established by prior administrative acts and general principles of administrative law.
For an international audience, the case illustrates a recurring tension in migration systems: the fragmentation of decision-making across different authorities and the risk of inconsistencies between domestic and consular stages.
The Italian administrative court addresses this tension by reaffirming a fundamental principle: discretion cannot replace proper reasoning, and administrative coherence must be preserved throughout the entire procedure.
In this sense, the judgment represents not only a correction of an individual decision, but also a broader signal aimed at ensuring greater consistency, predictability, and legal certainty in the management of labour migration.
About the author
Fabio Loscerbo is an Italian lawyer based in Bologna, specialized in immigration and administrative law. His work focuses on visa procedures, residence permits, and judicial review of administrative decisions in migration matters. He is also registered in the European Union Transparency Register as a lobbyist in the field of migration and asylum (ID 280782895721-36) and promotes research and policy analysis through the ReImmigrazione project (www.reimmigrazione.com). His academic profile is available at: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428
The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.
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