A recent judgment delivered by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio (TAR Lazio, Section V Quater, judgment published on 17 April 2026, general register number 10486 of 2025) provides a significant clarification on the legal consequences of submitting false documentation in visa procedures, with specific reference to decisions taken by the Italian Embassy in New Delhi.

The case concerned the refusal of a visa for subordinate employment issued by the Italian diplomatic mission in India, one of the busiest consular posts in terms of labour migration flows toward Europe. The applicant, an Indian national, had obtained a work authorization (nulla osta) from the Italian authorities but was denied entry on the ground that the document presented in support of the application had been altered.

This element proved decisive.

From a legal standpoint, the judgment marks a clear boundary between administrative discretion and bound administrative power. While consular authorities generally retain a margin of evaluation in visa procedures, this margin disappears entirely when specific legal conditions triggering automatic inadmissibility are met.

At the core of the decision lies Article 4, paragraph 2, of Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, according to which the submission of false or counterfeit documents in support of a visa application entails the automatic rejection of the application.

The Court interpreted this provision as establishing a rigid legal consequence: once falsification is ascertained, the administration is not exercising discretion but applying a mandatory rule.

This aspect is particularly relevant in the operational context of the Italian Embassy in India, where visa applications are often processed through external service providers such as VFS Global and where large volumes of applications may increase the risk of irregular or manipulated documentation.

In this case, the diplomatic authority identified a discrepancy in the date of issuance of the work authorization submitted by the applicant. The Court found that the altered document was duly established by the administration and that attributing such alteration to the diplomatic authority itself would be unreasonable, given the lack of any interest on its part in influencing the outcome of the procedure.

Once this finding was confirmed, the legal consequences followed automatically.

The Court explicitly stated that, in such circumstances, the refusal of the visa is a “bound act” (atto dovuto), requiring no further balancing of interests or additional reasoning beyond the verification of falsity.

This has two important implications.

First, the administration is not required to conduct a broader assessment of the applicant’s situation. Even elements that might otherwise be favourable – such as the existence of a valid work authorization issued at a later stage – become irrelevant once the submission of false documentation is established.

Second, the scope of judicial review is significantly limited. The Court clarified that the administrative assessment of falsity does not require a prior criminal conviction and may be based on reasonable and sufficiently supported findings. When such an assessment is properly conducted, it is not subject to substantive re-evaluation by the administrative judge.

This approach reflects a broader concern for the integrity of visa procedures, particularly in high-demand consular contexts such as India, where the reliability of documentation plays a crucial role in the management of migration flows.

The judgment also addresses procedural issues, including the alleged violation of the right to be heard. The Court rejected this argument, noting both the legislative developments that have limited the application of prior notice requirements in such procedures and the non-invalidating nature of any procedural defects in cases involving bound administrative powers.

From a broader perspective, the decision confirms a fundamental principle: while judicial review serves as a safeguard against arbitrary or insufficiently reasoned decisions, it does not extend to overriding clear legislative provisions that impose automatic consequences.

For an international audience, this case illustrates the dual nature of consular decision-making. On the one hand, consular authorities operate within a framework of discretion, particularly when assessing complex factual situations. On the other hand, certain legal conditions – such as the use of false documentation – transform that discretion into a strictly regulated, mandatory function.

In the specific context of the Italian Embassy in India, the judgment highlights the importance of ensuring both procedural efficiency and documentary reliability, reinforcing the idea that migration governance depends not only on administrative evaluation but also on the credibility of the information provided by applicants.

Ultimately, the decision does not merely confirm the lawfulness of a visa refusal. It delineates a clear legal threshold: beyond a certain point, administrative discretion ceases to exist, and the outcome of the procedure becomes legally predetermined.

About the author

Fabio Loscerbo is an Italian lawyer based in Bologna, specialized in immigration and administrative law. His work focuses on visa procedures, residence permits, and judicial review of administrative decisions in migration matters. He is also registered in the European Union Transparency Register as a lobbyist in the field of migration and asylum (ID 280782895721-36) and promotes research and policy analysis through the ReImmigrazione project (www.reimmigrazione.com). His academic profile is available at: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

A recent judgment delivered by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio (TAR Lazio, Section V Quater, judgment published on 1 April 2026, general register number 2871 of 2024) offers an important clarification on the limits of consular discretion in the context of work visa procedures.

The case concerned the refusal of a visa for subordinate employment issued by the Italian Embassy in Islamabad. The applicant, a Pakistani national, had obtained a prior work authorization (nulla osta) from the competent Italian authorities but was subsequently denied entry on the basis that he did not hold a driving licence.

This reasoning was found by the Court to be inadequate.

From a legal perspective, the judgment highlights a structural issue in migration governance: the relationship between domestic administrative procedures and consular decision-making abroad.

In the Italian system, the issuance of a work visa follows a two-step process. First, the competent immigration office (Sportello Unico per l’Immigrazione) assesses the application and grants a work authorization. Only at a later stage does the consular authority issue the visa, which should normally be consistent with the prior administrative determination.

In this case, the Court emphasized that the consular authority cannot disregard the outcome of the domestic procedure without conducting an adequate and independent assessment.

The refusal was based on the assumption that a driving licence was required for the position of manual worker in the construction sector. However, the Court found that this requirement had not been properly established and, more importantly, had not been assessed during the initial administrative phase leading to the issuance of the work authorization.

The judgment underlines that such a deficiency amounts to a clear failure of investigation and reasoning.

The Court further observed that the authority competent to assess the professional requirements of the job position is, in principle, the immigration office that issued the work authorization. In this case, that office had not raised any concerns and had not revoked the authorization, nor had it requested additional checks from the labour inspectorate.

This element is decisive: once the administrative procedure has been completed positively, the consular authority cannot introduce new requirements based on incomplete or unsupported assumptions.

The reasoning of the judgment is particularly significant in that it explicitly characterizes the refusal as “apodictic”, meaning that it lacks a proper logical and evidentiary foundation.

Such a characterization is not merely formal. It reflects a broader judicial concern regarding the risk of arbitrary decision-making in visa procedures, especially when decisions are based on generic or unverified criteria.

As a consequence, the Court annulled the refusal and clarified that, in the subsequent re-examination of the case, the diplomatic authority cannot rely on the same insufficient evidentiary basis.

This statement introduces a form of “constraining effect” on the administration, limiting the possibility of reiterating the same reasoning without addressing the deficiencies identified by the Court.

From a broader perspective, this decision contributes to redefining the scope of consular discretion. While consular authorities undoubtedly retain a margin of evaluation in visa procedures, this discretion is not absolute and must operate within the framework established by prior administrative acts and general principles of administrative law.

For an international audience, the case illustrates a recurring tension in migration systems: the fragmentation of decision-making across different authorities and the risk of inconsistencies between domestic and consular stages.

The Italian administrative court addresses this tension by reaffirming a fundamental principle: discretion cannot replace proper reasoning, and administrative coherence must be preserved throughout the entire procedure.

In this sense, the judgment represents not only a correction of an individual decision, but also a broader signal aimed at ensuring greater consistency, predictability, and legal certainty in the management of labour migration.

About the author

Fabio Loscerbo is an Italian lawyer based in Bologna, specialized in immigration and administrative law. His work focuses on visa procedures, residence permits, and judicial review of administrative decisions in migration matters. He is also registered in the European Union Transparency Register as a lobbyist in the field of migration and asylum (ID 280782895721-36) and promotes research and policy analysis through the ReImmigrazione project (www.reimmigrazione.com). His academic profile is available at: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

A recent judgment delivered by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio (TAR Lazio, Section II, judgment published on 27 March 2026, general register number 619 of 2026) provides a significant illustration of the limits of administrative discretion in visa procedures and the role of judicial review in consular decision-making.

The case concerned the refusal of a long-term study visa (type D) issued by the Italian Consulate in Istanbul. The application had been rejected on the ground that the applicant allegedly failed to meet the required financial criteria.

However, the factual background revealed a more complex situation. The applicant and his family had demonstrated the availability of substantial financial resources, including savings exceeding the minimum thresholds established by law. Despite this, the consular authority dismissed such evidence, arguing that part of the funds had been deposited shortly before the visa application and that some originated from the liquidation of a pension fund.

The Court found this reasoning insufficient and ultimately unlawful.

From a legal standpoint, the judgment is particularly relevant for two main reasons.

First, it reaffirms the fundamental requirement of proper reasoning and adequate investigation in administrative decisions. The Court explicitly held that it is unreasonable to disregard financial resources solely because they were made available shortly before the application. In the absence of further elements suggesting fraud or inconsistency, such a circumstance cannot automatically undermine the credibility of the applicant’s financial capacity.

This aspect is crucial in the context of visa procedures, where consular authorities often rely on standardized criteria that may lead to rigid or overly formalistic assessments. The decision clarifies that administrative discretion cannot translate into arbitrary evaluation, especially when applicants provide objective and verifiable documentation.

Second, the judgment highlights the importance of procedural fairness and dialogue between the administration and the applicant. The Court criticized the introduction of additional grounds during litigation, particularly those relating to the applicant’s academic path, which had not been previously addressed in the administrative phase. According to the Court, such issues should have been examined through proper interaction, including, where appropriate, a personal interview.

This reinforces a broader principle: consular decision-making, although exercised abroad and within a context of wide discretion, remains subject to the same standards of transparency, consistency, and procedural guarantees that apply to domestic administrative action.

Another relevant element concerns the temporal scope of financial requirements. The Court observed that a study visa is granted for a limited duration (typically one year), and that the assessment of long-term sustainability is, at least in part, deferred to the renewal phase handled by domestic authorities.

This clarification limits the tendency of consular authorities to impose excessively strict standards at the initial stage, effectively shifting part of the evaluative burden to subsequent administrative procedures.

The outcome of the case reflects these considerations. The Court annulled the refusal decision and ordered the administration to re-examine the application within twenty days, taking into account the documentation submitted and the legal principles established in the judgment.

However, the Court did not directly order the issuance of the visa, emphasizing that the identified deficiencies concerned the decision-making process rather than the final outcome. This approach preserves the administration’s discretionary power while ensuring that it is exercised lawfully.

From a broader perspective, this judgment contributes to an ongoing evolution in the relationship between consular authorities and judicial oversight. It confirms that visa decisions, often perceived as inherently discretionary and difficult to challenge, are in fact fully subject to judicial scrutiny where procedural guarantees and reasoning requirements are at stake.

For an international audience, the case illustrates a key dynamic in migration governance: the balance between administrative discretion in managing entry conditions and the need to ensure effective legal protection for applicants. As mobility increasingly depends on administrative decisions taken at the consular level, the role of courts becomes essential in maintaining this balance.

In this sense, the Italian experience offers a relevant example of how judicial review can function as a corrective mechanism, promoting more consistent and accountable decision-making in visa procedures.

About the author

Fabio Loscerbo is an Italian lawyer based in Bologna, specialized in immigration and administrative law. His work focuses on visa procedures, residence permits, and judicial review of administrative decisions in migration matters. He is also registered in the European Union Transparency Register as a lobbyist in the field of migration and asylum (ID 280782895721-36) and promotes research and policy analysis through the ReImmigrazione project (www.reimmigrazione.com). His academic profile is available at: https://orcid.org/0009-0004-7030-0428

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

Long before migration became dominated by visa regimes, biometric controls, and international governance frameworks, cross-border mobility was organised through markets. Travel agencies—often small, entrepreneurial businesses—were once central actors to making migration possible. In the decades after the Second World War, however, these private intermediaries suddenly found themselves competing with a new international organisation: the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), today’s International Organization for Migration (IOM).

This was not a minor institutional adjustment; it was an entrepreneurial turf war over who would control migration as a service. Its legacy still shapes the hybrid migration systems in which consular professionals operate today.

Travel agencies as early migration infrastructure

Until the mid-twentieth century, travel agencies were not merely ticket sellers. They served as migration infrastructure and intermediaries. For aspiring migrants, especially those with limited literacy or bureaucratic knowledge, agencies were often the primary point of contact with the state.

Agents handled documentation, arranged medical examinations, prepared migrants for consular interviews, secured visas and sponsorship letters, booked accommodation in port cities, and coordinated overseas transport. In practice, they translated state requirements into actionable steps. As migration became increasingly bureaucratic after 1945, many would have found it nearly impossible without this mediation.

For consular offices, travel agencies were both useful and problematic. They reduced the administrative burden by pre-screening applicants, but they also created information asymmetries. Consulates rarely knew how much migrants paid, what promises were made, or how far agents stretched—or crossed—the law.

Migration as a commercial service

What do we mean by ‘migration as a commercial service’? Simply put, migration was something you purchased.

Agencies earned income through service fees and, importantly, commissions from shipping lines and airlines. The more tickets they sold, the greater their reward. This commission-based system incentivised aggressive client recruitment and creative problem-solving, but it also fostered practices that blurred the line between facilitation and exploitation.

By the 1950s, these businesses had formed what can meaningfully be called a post-WWII ‘migration industry’: a network of agents, sub-agents, transport companies, doctors, and intermediaries connecting countries of origin and destination. Migration flows were shaped not only by law and policy, but also shaped by profit motives, competition, and market access.

When did this change? Post-WWII mass migration and ICEM

The turning point came after 1945. Europe faced mass displacement, unemployment, and demographic pressure, while overseas countries sought labour to drive post-WWII growth. Migration expanded dramatically in scale, along with efforts to manage it internationally.

Founded in 1951 during the Cold War, ICEM was created to organise and subsidise migration from Europe to overseas Western countries. It chartered ships and aircraft, bulk-booked space on commercial vessels and airlines, processed migrants directly, and subsidised migration with funds from its member states, asking migrants to pay only a fraction of what private agents charged.

For migrants, ICEM opened new opportunities. For travel agencies, it posed an existential threat, breaking their monopoly over overseas migration almost overnight.

ICEM versus travel agencies: conflict and adaptation

ICEM took over functions that travel agencies had long considered their own: migrant selection, documentation, medical screening, and transport. Unsurprisingly, agencies resisted.

Across Europe, they lobbied governments, mobilised the press, and accused ICEM of unfair competition. Why, they asked, should an international organisation perform the work of licensed private businesses—often tax-exempt and subsidised?

Yet resistance gradually gave way to adaptation. ICEM needed transport companies; travel agencies needed access to shipping space. In some cases, ICEM allocated surplus berths to agencies for their self-paying clients. Agencies, in turn, benefited indirectly from the migration chains ICEM helped create: more migrants abroad meant more family reunification cases, more travel, and eventually more tourism. Competition gave way to selective cooperation, even if mistrust remained.

Consulates caught between institutions and markets

Throughout this period, consular offices found themselves caught in the middle. They faced pressure from agencies eager to speed up applications, migrants confused by overlapping pathways, and ICEM asserting its international mandate. Informal practices flourished: agents received advance information, intermediaries promised ‘inside access’, and migrants were sometimes pushed to switch between institutional and commercial channels.

Purely legal or procedural control proved insufficient. Migration governance operated through negotiation, discretion, and constant adjustment. Consular authority remained central—but never exclusive.

Why this history matters today

This post-WWII entrepreneurial turf war offers a crucial lesson: migration systems have never been purely public. Today’s visa consultants, recruiters, education agents, relocation firms, and digital platforms inherit the same logic that once shaped travel agencies’ work. International organisations still combine humanitarian mandates with operational imperatives. States continue to rely on private intermediaries while trying to regulate them.

For consular professionals, this history explains why hybrid systems persist—and why tensions between public authority and private mediation are not anomalies, but structural features of migration governance.

Understanding migration as both a political process and a commercial service clarifies the realities of consular work today. The post-WWII past reminds us that markets do not merely operate around migration systems; they help build them.

About the author

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris holds a PhD from the Department of Political Science and History at Panteion University, Greece, awarded in 2023. His dissertation examines the relationship between migration, international organisations, and the private sector from 1951 to 1980. In 2020, Ioannis was awarded the John Scholes Transport History Research Essay prize for his original research work in transport history, and in 2023, his dissertation was shortlisted by the European Business History Association (EBHA) as one of the three best dissertations in business history. Ioannis’ research interests include migration history, business history, maritime and aviation history, and the history of international organisations.

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

In this article, I decided to highlight the American consulate, which is located in the Old City of Tripoli. It is located precisely in the small Hammam alley (Hammam Darghout) at Bab Elbhar Huma, or as many call it, the diplomatic European district. In this neighborhood, many consulates are located, and counselors lived in it. There have been contradictions about whether the building is the American consulate, and it has been confirmed by the diaries of doctor Jonathan Cowdery, who was among the American captives. The building was used as a consulate throughout the years from 1798 to 1805 and until 1829.

The entrances of the consulate are opposite to the small hammam alley, which is located between Darghout mosque street and the crossroad of El-Reah alley (Albasha previously), and with Truk Souq and Suk Elhrara alley at Bab Elbhar region. It is similar in terms of architectural style to the Danish consulate in Al-Reah alley and the Alkarmanli house on the four pillars street. It was built in the Alkarmanli era, and even with the poor status of the building now, it still preserves the uniqueness of these buildings, which sets them apart from other buildings in the Old City. The Bab Elbhar area is famous for having the same style of architecture.

The building has had numerous names; it was called AlMalkian because it was used as a consulate. Also, as a prison for American captives, and it was also called Al-Ghidamsi house and Al-Ghidamsi hotel according to the origin of its owners – Atheni family. It was also named the treehouse because of a palm tree in the middle of the courtyard. In addition, Asseri hotel according to Mohamed Asseri, who rented the house from the Atheni family in the 1960s.

When the Atheni family bought the house at an auction, they never used it for accommodation; in fact, they rented the house to some families. Bashir Atheni mentioned the mistake of calling the building as AL-Ghidamsi hotel, and it was only known as a hotel when Mohamed Asseri rented it.

According to resources, the reasons behind using it as a hotel were for storing goods. The building was rented to a Jewish man named Akbalay Bebi, and he was a businessman who used the building for two reasons: one was for living on the first floor, and the ground floor was mainly used for storing his goods during 1927/1926. It was rented to Mohamed Asseri in 1963 for about 10 years, and he changed the style in order to have many rooms for renting. He rented the rooms to families and individuals until 1978, when the former regime took the building from Asseri, and then the building was closed by municipal guardians because of continuous problems and incidents.

Pictures of the 2019 status of the building, and they are taken by the photographer Hiba Shalabi:

You can follow her on social networks for more information about the current status of the Old City in Tripoli. She is the one who started the Save the Old City of Tripoli campaign.

Source of information: “The American Consulate Building” book by Ahlam Zubeida and Abulrazaq Kurera in 2004.

About the author

Malak Altaeb is an independent consultant, blogger, and researcher from Libya, and is currently based in Paris, France. She is the creator of Libyan Wanderer, a website she has been running since 2017.

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

Libya’s division between Tripoli and Benghazi is shaping Europe’s migration and security challenges for the decade ahead. With Tripoli embroiled in political unrest and Haftar’s east backed by Russia and Turkey, Europe risks losing leverage over its southern borders. A coherent EU strategy that engages both east and west is essential to managing migration flows and safeguarding European interests.

Article

Since the fall of the despotic regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been a country embroiled in political turmoil, split between east and west. The North African country sits on the southern edge of the Mediterranean Sea, across the water from Italy, a country with which it shares a fraught colonial past. But Libya is a nation that has as much influence on the future of European affairs as it does play a part in its history. The deteriorating political situation in Tripoli, home to the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), is offering greater encouragement to smuggling gangs crossing from the Sahel to use Libya as a transit point from which migrants can cross the Mediterranean and eventually enter mainland Europe.

The political instability in the western-backed capital of Tripoli is an issue that, thus far, Europe has failed to adequately contend with. Tripoli has experienced conflict between rival militias across 2025, and the GNU has failed to get a grip on the situation. Speaking at the UN Security Council in June this year, the UK ambassador to Libya Dame Barbara Woodward said that: “We are concerned at Libya’s trajectory, particularly the worsening political and economic conditions. And these trends threaten the country’s stability, sovereignty, and unity.” Due to this deteriorating situation in the west, Europe has begun to slowly engage with eastern Libya, led by General Khalifa Haftar. However, relations have been strained, and this was highlighted by the acrimonious exit of an EU delegation from Benghazi after the Haftar government accused them of “disregarding national sovereignty" in July of this year. For the EU, this expulsion was a moment of embarrassment on the international stage and one that highlighted the fact that the dynamics of power may be shifting in Libya. Tripoli is chaotic and unpredictable, whilst Benghazi is firm and growing more assured.

For Europe, the more concerning facet of Benghazi’s growing surety is the fact that it is enjoying the support of EU rivals in the shape of Russia and Turkey. However, practical and diplomatic constraints limit how far Europe can pivot east. Only the executive in Tripoli is formally recognised by the UN and the wider international community, and key institutions such as the Central Bank and visa authorities remain based there. For now, Tripoli remains the EU’s central point of access, even as its influence wanes.

This leaves a gap that others are eager to fill. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has received sustained military and economic support from Russia, Egypt, and the UAE, with Wagner Group fighters playing a particularly visible role. Some observers warn that continued diplomatic exclusion by Europe could drive the LNA deeper into Moscow’s orbit, raising the prospect of an internationally backed Eastern Libya. Such an outcome would complicate any EU-led migration strategy and weaken Europe’s leverage over its southern flank. For Haftar, meanwhile, instability in Tripoli has only strengthened his hand, allowing him to project himself as a coherent political alternative. The Benghazi expulsion incident (Reuters) underscored this growing confidence, as tensions between east and west persisted through 2025 against the backdrop of a stalled national reconciliation process.

Libya’s fractured landscape makes it the decisive test of whether the EU can coordinate a credible migration policy over the next decade. As the main departure point for migrants crossing the central Mediterranean, stability or the lack of it in Libya will determine whether Europe faces manageable flows or recurring crises. Engagement limited to Tripoli risks becoming ever more effective if Benghazi continues to consolidate power with backing from Moscow and Ankara, while ignoring the east altogether would only deepen Europe’s vulnerability. For Brussels, forging a coherent approach to Libya is not just about addressing today’s crossings but about shaping the political and security environment that will define Europe’s migration challenges for years to come. Without a strategy that accounts for both east and west, Europe risks ceding control of its own borders to actors whose interests lie far beyond the continent.

About the author

Eddie Monkman is a Political Science graduate and London-based freelance journalist who writes on politics, culture, and international events with a specific focus on Libyan politics in the 21st century. Eddie’s entire portfolio can be found here.

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

Kim Yong-chang, a former agent of the U.S. 501st military intelligence brigade, has been featured in the news over the past week after giving testimony about his intelligence-gathering during the Kwangju Uprising at both the National Assembly and the May 18 Memorial Culture Center in Kwangju. In particular, as noted in the Korea Times and the Korea Herald, Kim reported that Chun Doo-hwan flew in a helicopter to Kwangju Air Base at noon on May 21, just an hour before troops opened fire on protesters in Kwangju; he argued it made sense that Chun issued the order to fire during this visit.

Needless to say, many people were quite happy to hear his testimony; I certainly was. There were a few things he said, however, that seemed questionable to me, and now I have good reason to treat some of his claims with caution.

This is because on May 18, Ohmynews published an article I've excerpted below based on a telephone interview with him the previous day:

Kim Yong-jang: "3-4 days before 5.18, only US citizens were evacuated from Kwangju"
Heo Jang-hwan: "'The US looked on as the new military authorities sent troops'...providing additional evidence to investigate the role of the US."

"3-4 days before the Kwangju Uprising, an order was issued to evacuate all American citizens residing in Gwangju. These were the instructions of the US Department of Defense. The evacuation order was only for Kwangju. The US knew the Kwangju Uprising was going to break out before it happened." [...]

The testimony of Kim Yong-jang that the US Department of Defense had issued evacuation instructions for Americans even before the first clash at Chonnam University on May 18 is a major clue that at that time the US had detected the moves of the new military authorities before they happened. In particular, when examining the ROK - US Defense Treaty which regulates US-Korean relations, this can be interpreted as US approval, condoning, or aiding in the operations of the new military authorities.

Kim said further that the "the United States knew the plans of the new military authorities in advance and evacuated only US citizens from Gwangju." He was contacted 3-4 days before May 18 and after that US citizens in Kwangju were pulled out. They were all evacuated, but 12 Mormon missionaries were stopped by Martial Law forces at Sangmudae and couldn't evacuate. He received further orders to pull them out, and did so on the 25th.

**********

The claim by Kim that the US evacuated its citizens from Kwangju before May 18 is not at all true. 12 Mormon missionaries were at Kwangju Airbase by May 26, but this seems to be the only aspect of his claim that has any basis in fact. US citizens were not only not evacuated from Kwangju before May 18, they were not urged to leave until either May 22 or 23, and by May 26, the day before the military re-invaded the city, there were still at least 33 US citizens in Kwangju. This claim by Kim is, in essence, the Kwangju Uprising's version of "Jews didn't go into work at the World Trade Center on September 11." It is a claim with grave implications for portrayals of the American role in the Kwangju Uprising. We can see above how Ohmynews is using it to argue that the US knew about Chun's crackdown before it happened, protected only their own citizens, and, since it did nothing else, must have been "approv[ing], condoning, or aiding in the operations of the new military authorities."

To summarize the sources below, according to Embassy cables, the US Embassy had almost no warning of the expansion of Martial Law on May 17. According to the memoir of missionary Arnold Peterson, who lived with several missionary families on a compound in Kwangju, four Baptists from Florida came to Kwangju May 16 for an evangelistic crusade scheduled for May 18-21. Peace Corps Volunteer Paul Courtright was at the Peace Corps office in Seoul on May 15 and was not warned against returning to Kwangju the next day.

David Miller, the US consular representative in Kwangju, stayed indoors for several days after May 18 before making his way to the air base on May 24. On May 22, Peterson received a call from a US soldier he was friends with at Kwangju Air Base saying they were considering rescuing the missionaries; Peterson said this was not necessary. Since Miller was was leaving the city, on May 23, Peterson became "involved in efforts by the U.S. Embassy to locate and confirm the safety of citizens of the United States and other countries who remained in Kwangju."

According to US Embassy cables to the State Department written by US Ambassador Gleysteen, on May 25 he wrote that had been "urging [American citizens] repeatedly to leave Kwangju in the last few days," which accords with Peterson's dates. He added that on "May 25 MOFA [ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs] requested that we urge all Americans to leave Kwangju and Mokpo as quickly as possible." He noted that "Twelve Mormon missionaries and five Canadian citizens are at the airbase at this time" but that most Americans were planning to remain in the city. He later wrote that "A USAF C-130 arrived at Osan from Kwangju at 1800 on May 26 carrying 23 evacuees." On the evening of May 26 MOFA called the embassy again, "asking for names and addresses of all Americans believed to be still in Kwangju" in order to assure their safety in the coming military operation. The "Embassy provided MOFA with a list of 33 names."

Therefore, not only did the US not evacuate its citizens from Kwangju before the uprising, it only urged them to leave from May 22 or 23 and then redoubled their efforts when the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested them to do so. In the end, at least 33 US citizens remained in the city when the military returned on May 27.

********

Below are more complete quotations and sources, as well as a few questions raised by some of Kim Yong-chan's other statements.

Contrary to Kim's claims, the US Embassy was given about an hour's notice of the expansion of martial law on May 17, and that was only because they were making queries about the student leaders arrested at Ehwa university. As Gleysteen described it in a cable to the State Department, "The military leaders have shown disregard for constituted authority in the ROK – and for us. We have been presented with a fait accompli suggesting that the military leaders either do not know or care about the consequences of treating us in this manner." But, after suggesting various ways in which they could protest the ROK's actions, he wrote, "I regret to say at this point our influence appears disturbingly limited."

The following is from the account of missionary Arnold A Peterson, titled "5.18: The Kwangju Incident," published in English in 1990, and available in both English and Korean in: 아놀드 A. 피터슨, 5.18 광주사태 (풀빛, 1995).

A Baptist evangelistic crusade was to be held May 18-21 in Kwangju and four Baptists from Florida came to Kwangju for this on the 16th. They were staying at the Tourist Hotel downtown – not the best choice, as it would turn out. They got a blast of pepper gas while walking from church to their hotel on May 18. The crusade had to be cancelled and the Baptists from Florida and some missionary children left Kwangju on May 22.

According to Peterson, on May 22,

At 5:00 p.m. Dave Hill, a friend who was a First Sergeant in the U.S. Air Force at SongJeong Ri called. He told us that the U.S. Air Force was considering making a forced entry of Kwangju to rescue the Americans in YangNim Dong. I said that there was no need for such action. The idea for the "rescue" was the result of false fears created by reports made to the Air Force by David Miller, the American consular representative in Kwangju who had left the city and gone to the airbase. [Page 225]

Actually, according to the diary of Linda Lewis, a former Peace Corps Volunteer doing PhD fieldwork in Kwangju, Miller left Kwangju on May 24. (Excerpts of her diary are reprinted in her book Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising (2002).

According to Peterson, on May 23,

I spent much of the afternoon making telephone calls on behalf of the U.S. Embassy. I had become involved in efforts by the U.S. Embassy to locate and confirm the safety of citizens of the United States and other countries who remained in Kwangju. The embassy's consular representative had fled Kwangju early in the week so the embassy had no official representative left in the city.

The method of the contacts with the Embassy was strange. During the pre-dawn hours on Wednesday, May 21, all long distance telephone lines between Kwangju and the rest of the nation were cut off by the military. The American military base at SongJeong Ri was outside the military perimeter which surrounded Kwangju. However, their telephone system was a part of the Kwangju local phone system. As a result, our friend, Dave Hill, a First Sergeant in the Air Force, was able to telephone us.

However, the telephone system on the American base was subject to the control of the Korean military. The Korean military tried to prevent calls between the American military and Kwangju citizens as a method of limiting the flow of information into and out of Kwangju. However, the American commander protested sufficiently that the Korean military agreed to allow the American base to make calls to our telephone number. After some additional negotiation, the Korean switchboard operator was also allowed to accept calls from my telephone and connect me through to the American base. In this way, we were able to communicate one or two times a day.

The embassy contacted me several times through the American Air Base. Each time they gave me the name, phone number, or other information about persons whose safety they wished to confirm. I then called or otherwise tried to contact these persons to gain information to pass along to the Embassy. Altogether, I made contact with eight other foreigners in Kwangju at the request of the American Embassy. [Pages 227-8]

According to Jean Underwood in her chapter, "An American Missionary’s View" in the book Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present (2003), there were at least 5 families of missionaries on their compound, so they would have made up a large share of the Americans in Kwangju.

The following information comes from US Embassy Cables to the State Department by Ambassador Gleysteen. Those from May 1980 are collected here.

On May 25, Gleysteen wrote (on page 255 / 253 of the pdf),

The Korean foreign ministry has now piously requested that all foreigners leave Kwangju for their own safety. American embassy and military authorities in Korea have formed a task force which is working late Sunday night on this problem. Initial conclusions are, however, that there is no way to extract the remaining Americans safely and that there is somewhat greater safety no[w] in their lying low in place. Those remaining (25-30 persons, including five Peace Corps Volunteers, missionaries and academics) had unwisely disregarded strong warnings from the American ambassador urging them repeatedly to leave Kwangju in the last few days while it was feasible to do [so]. The five Peace Corps Volunteers defied a direct order to leave. Once out of Kwangju, they will be sent home.

American citizens being urged "repeatedly to leave Kwangju in the last few days" would accord with Peterson's calls starting on the 23rd (though he makes no mention of requests by the Embassy to leave). As well, according to Linda Lewis, US consular representative in Kwangju David Miller had urged her "to get a bag packed" on May 22.

On May 26, Gleysteen wrote (on page 260 / 258 of the pdf),

Shortly after 1800 May 25 MOFA requested that we urge all Americans to leave Kwangju and Mokpo as quickly as possible. With the help of BPAO Miller, who had just left Kwangju, and consular records, we were able to pass a list of those Americans thought still to be in Kwangju to the American OIC [Officer in Charge] at the nearby ROKAF base. Twenty-five of the Americans were contacted by the OIC. (No calls are permitted from Seoul to Kwangju, but we have a line to the airbase and a Ministry of Communications line to Kwangju for emergency use.) Six remain to be reached, but, of course, there may be other U.S. citizens there not presently known to embassy. Some of those contacted decided they would try to reach the military base, although they would have to pass through barriers manned by radicals and ROK military astride all routes leading out of the city. Twelve Mormon missionaries and five Canadian citizens are at the airbase at this time. Others have decided to remain in their homes for safety or other reasons. Four Peace Corps Volunteers could not be reached. (We have talked with PCV Paul Courtwright. [sic]) We are making another attempt to contact all those we have not spoken with and will report as Americans reach the base.

Later that day, he wrote,

A USAF C-130 arrived at Osan from Kwangju at 1800 on May 26 carrying 23 evacuees (including four Canadians and one South African.[...]

There are four Peace Corps Volunteers in Kwangju: Tim Warnberg, David Dolinger, Judith Chamberlin and Julie Pickering. Peace Corps has 24 other volunteers in Chollas and has contacted all but one, asking them to come to Seoul.[...]

MOFA called Embassy evening of May 26 asking for names and addresses of all Americans believed to be still in Kwangju. MOFA officials indicated that information would be passed along to Martial Law Command in attempt to assure AmCits’ safety. Embassy provided MOFA with a list of 33 names - - all the Americans there that we are aware of at this moment. If we learn of any others, we will notify MOFA immediately.

I asked Paul Courtright, one of Peace Corps Volunteers in Kwangju at the time, for his thoughts on the claim that the US issued an evacuation order before May 18, and he replied, "That is the first I've ever heard of such an order and I think there is little credibility." He added the following:

I was in Seoul on May 14-15. On the 15th I was at the [Peace Corps] office. I took the 고속 bus from Seoul to Gwangju on May 16. PC knew I was going to Gwangju. The point of this: if there was such an evacuation order, the PC would have told me not to go. There was no mention of any evacuation.

As for when the Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) in Kwangju were first told to evacuate, he wrote, "The first we heard of the order to leave was on 23 May. Judi Chamberlin was the person who told us. Judi may have got the message on 22 May but she did not come over to Tim's to tell us until 23 May."

Peace Corps Volunteer David Dolinger wrote that he was in contact with the Peace Corps office in Seoul on May 22. All of the above accounts point to May 22 or 23 as the date when the US Embassy and the Peace Corps office began urging (or ordering, in the case of the PCVs) American citizens to leave Kwangju. Needless to say, this was five or six days into the uprising, not three or four days before.

*********

Some of Kim Yong-jang's other statements, particularly one reported in the Korea Herald about how he "said he filed 40 reports to the US officials, three of which were read by then-US President Carter," made me rather suspicious. How would an intelligence gatherer know his report had been read by the president? As far as I know, most raw intelligence reports would be sifted through and compiled into prepared reports for the Pentagon, and then passed upward; it would be unusual for raw intelligence reports to be passed upwards, particularly to the president. Seeing how Kim has now made a clearly incorrect statement - one seemingly meant to show the US in a negative light - his claim that President Carter read his reports, which included information about "the military’s corpse disposal, helicopter shooting, sexual assaults and takeover of Gwangju Prison" should be treated with skepticism.

About the author

Originally hailing from Canada, Matt VanVolkenburg first arrived in Korea in 2001. Fascinated by Korea's modern history, in 2005 he began writing about Korean history, society, and culture on his blog, Gusts of Popular Feeling. He supplemented his history degree with an MA in Korean Studies received from the University of Washington in 2017 and is currently helping lead Royal Asiatic Society Korea while researching 1970s Korean youth culture, the history of Itaewon, and the Gwangju Uprising.

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

What happened to the children? The Fairbridge Plan for caring for British child migrants originated with Kingsley Fairbridge’s Vision Splendid. He loathed the conditions of the thousands of under-privileged children with no future other than poverty. He wanted to transplant such children to the wide-open spaces in the colonies; the crowded orphanages were very happy to send their charges overseas.

For their part, the Australian and other British Empire governments hoped these schemes would supply them with much needed population and labour. They could have imported cheap labour from any country, but they wanted sound, British stock. "This programme is not a charity", declared the Prince of Wales in 1934 of the work of the Fairbridge farm schools... "it is an Imperial investment". These child mig­rat­ion schemes must have been seen to be successful; they received poor publicity from the outset, yet they continued until the 1960s.

But war time was different. The book Oceans Apart, written by Penny Starns and published by The History Press 2014, showed that from May 1940 many British parents und­erstood that their cities could be bombed to smithereens. Wise parents chose to move their children safely abroad to the British Dominions. As a result the Children's Overseas Reception Board (CORB) scheme was extremely popular, and 200,000+ applications were made by the time the scheme closed just four months later. One third of the CORB children were Scottish, one third were Welsh and the rest were English.

Was sound British stock still a criterion in WW2? The book discusses eugenicist views in Britain which the CORB programme assiduously tried to avoid. But the Dominion States decided on their own rules – South Africa refused to accept any Jewish children; a colour bar was in operation in all the host countries; the number of Catholic children was restricted; and children with any medical defects were excluded. German, Austrian and Polish refugee children, desperately trying to survive the war in Britain, were universally rejected by the CORB programme.

CORB packing lists were sent to British parents in 1940, to prepare for the evacuation of their children overseas. Host families in the new countries were given a list of guiding principles. The BBC agreed to support parent-child links with their regular Director of Empire Programmes.

Saying goodbye at the port was heartbreaking. When parents accomp­an­ied their children to the port, neither generation knew if they would ever see each other again. Singing patriotic songs loudly might have reflected the mood well, but the songs left the families emotionally exhausted. And the photos in the book evoke an optimistic experience that was also full of loss and heartbreak.

On at least one occasion the ship never made it to the Dominions. In Sept 1940, the ship SS City of Benares was torpedoed by a German U-boat en route to Canada. Carrying 406 passengers and crew including CORB children and private evacuees, the ship sank in the freezing waters of the North Atlantic and 256 passengers died. Wherever possible, the adults onboard sacrificed their own lives in order that the children could get safe seats on the life­boats.

After the City of Benares went down, attempts were made to resurrect the CORB scheme, but by March 1941, British parents were not prepared to risk another catastrophe. In total 2,863 British children had safely arrived, half of them to Canada (1,523), and the rest to Australia, South Africa and New Zealand.

I was not surprised that the old British Empire nations rallied to help the children. One would expect Canada etc. to want to help the motherland, and would want to bring in good quality children to per­haps make their future homes in the ex-colonies. But one might not have expected the USA to feel very connected to British children. No CORB children were sent to the USA but welfare agencies in the USA organised private evacuations. Huge companies like Kodak and Ford also participated.

The book discusses at length what happened to the children, once they landed. The British government paid for the ship fare but it was up to the host nation to feed, clothe and house the newly arrived young visitors. Some were adopted by warm, loving host families, especially when the host families were already related to the sea-vacs. But if perfect strangers took them in, the Australian government paid finan­cial support to the foster parents while the Canadian government did not. No doubt that homesickness was an issue for all the children, so there was an urgent need to stay in contact with their parents back in the UK.

Some private sea-vacs met with hostility. In Canada in particular it was felt that these arranged evacuations were enabling the wealthy and educated classes to save their own sons from fighting in the war. But since the children were all under 16, this sounds far fetched to me.

But the decision to go home at the end of the war created mixed emotions. Some of the older evacuees even chose to remain in their new homes and not return at all. Others went back to the UK, but app­lied to return to their host nation as adult migrants, or encour­aged their entire families to emigrate. Even those CORB evacuees who rushed back to their parents as soon as possible might have had some trouble settling down in post-war Britain. The youngest of the CORB children certainly had learned to speak with foreign accents during their years away.

By February 1946, most sea-vacs had arrived back home in the UK.

About the author

The author is the creator of Art and Architecture, mainly, a blog that has been running since 2008.

The views expressed are solely those of the author(s), not of the Center.

I believe that knowing our country’s history is a basic need for generations to learn how to appreciate and connect with their roots. Sadly, the former regime diminished that connection through education. History and social studies books only discussed the regime’s ruling system and made sure that they nurture it into our minds from an early age.

It is a shame that so many are ignorant of the period before 1969. We know the Italian colonization from the iconic persona Omar Al-Mokhtar. He fought the Italians with admirable courage. He is a role model for so many people to this day. When the revolution broke out in the country, it somehow paved the way for us again to reconnect with Libya’s history.

As some may know that the Italian colonization was clear in the architecture in Tripoli with the high arches and little details on buildings downtown. However, how much do we know beyond this? I bet none. After the revolution in 2011, I heard of a place in Tripoli called “Dar Hasan Al-Fakih” or “Al-Fakih House” which was the first French consulate in Libya.

Before the revolution, it held musical nights for ambassadors and prestigious characters. Also, it was open to visitors and tourists. They used to visit it and history students who needed books related to their studies. Now, the house has been hosting workshops and open discussions about the artistic scene in Libya, architecture, poetry, and history of the old city of Tripoli. The former consulate is located in the so-called French Street.

Believe it or not, this was my first visit to the place and it won’t be the last. The building is designed in a creative way. You can clearly see the Islamic architecture of the building alongside with the local architecture. From the wooden door, the central courtyard to the high roofs.

The special thing about the place is that everything is connected. It consists of two floors. The first is right after the lobby with five rooms in the courtyard. There is one main stair that leads to two branched stairs on the second floor where you can find the consul office. The second floor is all connected; you don’t need stairs to go to the other side. The place has so many big windows to let air in. It has a balcony which opened to Tripoli’s busy pier.

I fell in love with every corner and detail. No matter how many times you visit it, it will seem like your first every time. You can always discover something new there. I could picture the consul sitting by his desk discussing important topics with his guests. Once you step into the building, you are automatically taken to that era and it is quite magical. It is never too late to discover your culture, there is always time.

About the author

Malak Altaeb is an independent consultant, blogger, and researcher from Libya, and is currently based in Paris, France. She is the creator of Libyan Wanderer, a website she has been running since 2017.

Set in an intentionally fictional town up the River Plata from Buenos Aires, The Honorary Consul is the story of the half-Argentinian, half-British doctor, Eduardo Plarr. His father missing since he was ten, Plarr has spent most of his life with his mother, and after obtaining his medical degree, settles her in the capital to live a life of peace and quiet while he remains behind in their rural hometown. One of only three Brits in the small city, he often dines with another expat, and when needed, provides assistance to a third, the British consul. Charlie Fortnum his name, the job is in title only. Fortnum's only actual pursuits are a daily measure of whiskey and driving his beat-up Land Rover through the fields of mate he oversees. Life moves easily for Plarr until all hell breaks looks when local guerrillas mistake Fortnum for the visiting American ambassador and kidnap him. The story which unravels thereafter is both absurd and tragic. But it's in the lives of the individual characters the circumstances come alive.

Though Fortnum’s kidnapping is the plot’s impetus, the hinge of tension is Clara. A former prostitute at Senora Sanchez’s, the young native girl marries the aged consul early in the story. The marriage, however, does not preclude an affair with Plarr. The doctor is friends with the local revolutionaries, and when he is called in to help, his sympathies do not know which way to turn as a result. Not making this any easier is Leon, a tenuous ex-priest who sides with guerrillas, and it is in his attitude and posturing that Greene presents the religious implications, both personal and political, underlying the insurgency’s rebellion.

Dr. Saavedra, a novelist friend of Plarr’s, is another significant character that adds to the novel’s layers. In the early story, he and Plarr can be found in light conversation on the merits of literature. Their discussion centers largely on the topic of Latin American machismo, particularly the lengths to which it drives the actions of men in the region. Saavedra argues for the poetic representation of the idea while Plarr remains skeptical, preferring a mimetic representation. Dovetailing nicely, the climax of The Honorary Consul displays elements of both, simultaneously linking the characters' viewpoints and adding a dimension of real world commentary.

Possessing the relationship struggles of The End of the Affair, the religious quandaries of The Power & the Glory, and the political intrigue of The Quiet American, The Honorary Consul is in many ways an amalgam of Greene’s oeuvre. Plarr’s interaction with both sides of the conflict, local government to guerrillas, bears a strong similarity to Fowler’s position in The Quiet American. In that book, Fowler essentially holds the life of the American in his hands, and through a combination of fate and free will, determines the outcome of the story. With Plarr overseeing Fortnum’s health, The Honorary Consul has much the same setup, though, to be fair, the individuals’ fates in the two novels move through different waters. Due to the fact Leon refrains from strong drink, his moral stance bears direct comparison to the peripatetic depravity of the ‘whiskey priest’ in The Power & the Glory. Greene an open Catholic, his tendency to view the religion through human rather than ideological eyes lends a stronger degree of credibility to his narratives (unlike, for example, the works of C.S. Lewis or Gene Wolfe). And lastly, Plarr’s affair with Fortnum’s wife does not form the lion’s share of content as it does in The End of the Affair, but the overall approach to the subject of fornication and love remains as mature, if not more so. Not so trite as Greene in a nutshell, the reader will nevertheless find a strong amalgam.

In the end, The Honorary Consul, while not generally listed among the best of Greene’s works, nevertheless possesses all the subject matter and style of the author’s oeuvre. Though ostensibly commentary on the seemingly perpetual state of political turmoil in Latin America and its inherent (ir)rationality, the novel is the story of a doctor caught up in the vicious cycle of guerrilla warfare and political tactics of the region. The absurdity of this premise plays out in all too human terms, easily placing the novel among Greene’s best. For its tragi-comedy mood, Our Man in Havana is the novel’s closest contemporary.

About the author

Jesse Hudson is the creator of Speculiction... ...the speculative in fiction and more, a blog he has been running since 2011.

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